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[[Forthcoming in Analysis – this is an uncorrected draft, so please don’t quote from or circulate this version!]] 
 
Plenty of Room Left for the Dogmatist 
 
1. Cartesian vs. Dogmatist Accounts of Perceptual Justification 
 
Barnett (2019) provides an interesting new challenge against Dogmatist1 accounts of 
perceptual justification. For present purposes, the Dogmatist’s key claim is the denial of the 
following ‘Cartesian’2 thesis:  
 
• (PERCEPTUAL INCREDULISM) One is never justified in believing what one 
perceives unless one has independent evidence that one’s perceptual experiences are 
reliable. 
 
To deny Incredulism is to allow that (some) experiences can provide (some degree of) 
justification even if you have no independent evidence that they are reliable.  
 
The Cartesian and the Dogmatist also disagree over the relative importance of one’s own 
experiences compared with other peoples’ experiences. The Cartesian accepts the following: 
 
• (PERCEPTUAL IMPARTIALITY) Having a perceptual experience can never give you 
substantially stronger justification for a perceptual belief than you would get from 
knowing that another person has had such an experience. 
 
Given a Cartesian view of your own experience, “it would seem irrationally chauvinistic to 
count one’s own experiences as stronger evidence of the truth than another person’s 
experiences, unless you have some evidence suggesting that your experiences really do 
amount to more reliable evidence.” (Barnett, 2019, 28) 
 
Whereas the Dogmatist accepts: 
 
• (PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY) Having a perceptual experience can sometimes give 
you substantially stronger justification for a perceptual belief than you would get from 
knowing that another person has had such an experience. 
                                                      
1 The label ‘Dogmatism’ is due to Jim Pryor’s (2000) seminal paper ‘The Skeptic & The Dogmatist’. 
2 Barnett generally uses the labels ‘Cartesian’ vs. ‘Anti-Cartesian’ – Dogmatism is then counted as one 
form of Anti-Cartesianism, whilst Epistemological Disjunctivism (e.g. McDowell 1994, Pritchard 
2012) is another kind of Anti-Cartesianism. 
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To be clear: the idea is not just that we have a special, introspective way of knowing about 
our own experiences (the Cartesian will happily accept this too.) The idea is that the mere fact 
of my having the experience can provide some degree of justification for a perceptual belief, 
quite apart from my knowing anything about this experience – and in particular, quite apart 
from knowing whether my own perceptual experiences are generally reliable.  
 
2. A Diachronic Problem for Dogmatism 
 
Given the Dogmatist commitment to Perceptual Partiality, let’s now consider the case where 
the ‘other person’ that you know to have had the experience is your own future self. 
 
‘(ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE) Shortly before noon, you are wearing a blindfold 
and facing a wall. You know that at noon, the blindfold will be removed, and that when 
it is, you will have an experience as of a red wall.’ (Barnett, 2019, 21) 
 
It seems that the Dogmatist cannot allow mere knowledge that one will have an experience in 
the future to provide the same special boost of justification that actually having the 
experience provides. After all, according to Perceptual Partiality, knowing that someone else 
has the experience does not provide the same boost as actually having the experience oneself 
– and it seems that one’s own future self should be no different from the Dogmatist point of 
view. For it is the actual experience itself, rather than any knowledge one has about the 
experience, which is supposed to be the distinctive source of justification. 
 
But so then the problem for the Dogmatist is that increasing your confidence that the wall is 
red at the time you actually have the experience, when you knew already that you were going 
to have just that experience, seems to amount to a kind of ‘diachronic’ irrationality. 
 
‘For suppose that before noon you withhold belief that the wall is red, even though you 
know that at noon the wall will look red to you. It seems irrational for you suddenly to 
be convinced that the wall is red once your blindfold is removed and you seem to see a 
red wall. You knew that this would happen! More generally, it seems irrational for you 
to substantially increase your confidence at noon that the wall is red, merely because 
you are having the very experience that you knew in advance you would have.’ (ibid., 
p22) 
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The problem here is that the subject in ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE will, if she increases 
her confidence as the Dogmatist suggests, violate what Van Fraassen (1984, 244) called 
‘Reflection’: 
 
• REFLECTION: Prt1(A|Prt2 (A) = n) = n 
 
I.e. if at t1 you know that at t2 your confidence in A will = n, then at t1 your confidence 
should already = n. Van Fraassen showed that if you do not obey reflection then you are open 
to being diachronically Dutch-Booked – i.e. you will accept bets at different times that are 
guaranteed to lose money over that time-period3. 
 
So in this ‘Anticipated Experience’ case: suppose you are a Dogmatist and at t1 you are 
suspending judgement whether there is a red wall before you. But you already know at t1 
that: at t2 you will have an experience as of a red wall. So, by the Dogmatist’s own lights, you 
can know at t1 that at t2 you will have some higher degree of confidence that there is a red 
wall before you (since you know at t1 that at t2 you will enjoy a confidence-boosting kind of 
experience). Which violates Reflection - as according to Reflection, you should already, at t1, 
adopt that higher degree of confidence. 
 
3. A response and an objection to it 
 
In what follows I want to defend the idea that the Dogmatist can ‘bite the bullet’ and simply 
accept that actually having an experience can rationally increase one’s confidence, even if 
one knew beforehand that one would have that very experience. 
 
For example: if someone whom you trust and take to be generally reliable tells you that you 
will have a red-wall-ish experience at noon, your confidence in the proposition: ‘I’ll have a 
red-wall-ish experience at noon’ may be around 0.9 or 0.95. Perhaps this relatively high level 
of credence counts as ‘knowing’ you will have such an experience at noon. But then when 
you actually have a red-wall-ish experience at noon (assuming you also know the time), your 
confidence in that proposition will become 1 or at least become extremely ‘close’4 to 1. And 
so, in turn, your new credence in the proposition that there is actually a red wall before you 
                                                      
3 Notice: it is standardly allowed that such a principle is only plausible on the assumption that you do 
not lose evidence between t1 and t2 or suffer from memory loss etc. 
4 I include scare-quotes around the word ‘close’ here since the main point of this paper will be that the 
notion of ‘closeness’ to 1 is problematically measure-sensitive – see section 4, below. 
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could be higher when you actually have the red-wall-ish experience compared with merely 
learning beforehand that you are going to have this kind of experience. 
 
This no longer seems to involve any kind of diachronic irrationality – for whilst S is pretty 
sure at t1 that she will have the experience at t2 (and thus that at t2 she will be confident that 
there is a red-wall before her), at t1 S is still not as certain about the occurrence of the 
experience at t2 as she is at t2. So it could still be rational for S to become more confident that 
there is a red wall before her at t2, when she actually has the red-wall-ish experience, despite 
already being pretty confident at t1 that this was going to happen. 
 
Barnett rejects this response on the following grounds: 
 
‘I admit that this defense gives a plausible explanation of why your confidence might 
justifiably increase slightly at noon… 
Even so, I think this defense cannot plausibly explain why one’s degree of confidence 
for p could rationally increase more than slightly. If one knows that e, then one has at 
most a little room for doubt about e. So there will be little room for one’s degree of 
certainty in e to increase, and thus little room for one’s confidence in p to increase as a 
result of an increase in the certainty of e. This is important, because the anti-Cartesian 
proponent of PERCEPTUAL PARTIALITY needs to say that one’s confidence that the 
wall is red can increase substantially at noon’ (ibid., 25) 
 
It matters for the Dogmatist that the extra ‘proprietary justification’ provided by actually 
having the experience is substantial, rather than just a slight increase, because one of the main 
motivations for Dogmatism (Anti-Cartesianism) is supposed to be its ability to help resist the 
Skeptic: 
 
‘…if having an experience offered only a slight increase in the strength of one’s 
justification relative to what one would get from knowing about another person’s 
experience, then the anti-Cartesian would have very limited anti-skeptical advantages 
over Cartesianism. For whatever the strength of our justification for perceptual beliefs 
might be under Cartesianism, the anti-Cartesian would be able to offer us only slightly 
more. That would be reassuring only if the skeptical worry was merely that we fall just 
slightly short of being justified in our perceptual beliefs! To have a noteworthy anti-
skeptical advantage, therefore, the anti Cartesian must claim that the proprietary 
justification conferred by one’s experiences is substantial.’ (ibid., 25-6) 
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In a footnote (fn29) he adds: 
 
‘Although I take this point to be intuitively plausible, it can be reinforced by the familiar 
theorem of the probability calculus that Pr(p) = Pr(p|e)Pr(e) + Pr(p|~e)Pr(~e). Since 
Pr(p|~e)Pr(~e) ≥ 0, this theorem entails that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e)Pr(e). So when for some 𝛿, 
Pr(e) = 1 - 𝛿, it follows that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e)(1 - 𝛿), and thus that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e) - Pr(p|e)𝛿. 
And since 𝛿 ≥ 0 and Pr(p|e) ≤ 1, this means that Pr(p) ≥ Pr(p|e) - 𝛿. Roughly put, the 
upshot is that Pr(p) can be less than Pr(p|e) only to whatever extent Pr(e) is less than 1.’ 
(ibid., 25) 
 
4. Log Odds and the ‘Room for Doubt’ 
 
The problem here is that this notion of there being only a ‘little room for one’s degree of 
certainty in e to increase’ and so of having only ‘little room for one’s confidence in p to 
increase’ is an artefact of measuring/expressing subjective probabilities or degrees of 
confidence on the interval 0 to 1. If we switch to expressing subjective probabilities in terms 
of Odds, or Log-Odds, the appearance of there being only ‘a little room’ left for confidence to 
increase vanishes. In other words, Barnett’s claim is problematically measure-sensitive5. 
Moreover, there are some good (familiar) reasons to think that the Log-Odds scale provides a 
clearer picture of how new evidence can boost already high levels of confidence and so to 
treat the familiar 0-1 interval scale as apt to be misleading in this respect. 
 
As well as expressing probabilities using numbers in the interval from 0 to 1 they can, of 
course, also be expressed as Odds – that is to say, as a ratio Pr(H)/ Pr(not-H). I.e. Pr(H)/Pr(1-
H) 
 
One respect in which using Odds can be simpler or easier than using numbers in the 0-1 
interval is that we can use the following simple formula: 
 
• Posterior Odds = Prior Odds x Likelihood ratio 
 
Or in a more explicit formulation: 
 
• PrNEW(H)/PrNEW(~H) = PrOLD(H)/PrOLD(~H) x Pr(e⎪H)/ Pr(e⎪~H) 
                                                      
5 See Fitelson 1999 and Brössel 2013 for extended discussions of measure sensitivity. 
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The likelihood ratio – Pr(e⎪H)/ Pr(e⎪~H) – expresses how much more likely the occurrence 
of the evidence would be given that the hypothesis is true compared to how likely it would be 
if the hypothesis is false. 
 
But notice: once we move to working with odds, probabilities are no longer expressed as 
numbers in the interval 0 to 1, but rather from 0 to positive infinity. Already then, we have 
reason to be suspicious of the idea that when I am already very confident of a hypothesis – 
e.g. the hypothesis that I will have a certain experience at noon – there is then only ‘a little 
room’ for my confidence to increase. When working with Odds there is always infinitely 
more ‘room’ for one’s confidence to increase! 
 
As well as working with odds, it can also sometimes be useful to work in ‘Log-Odds’. If we 
take the logarithm of both sides of the equation above we get: 
 
• Log[Posterior Odds] = log[Prior Odds] + log[Likelihood ratio] 
 
Or more explicitly: 
 
• Log[PrNEW(H)/PrNEW(~H)] = log[PrOLD(H)/PrOLD(~H)] + log[Pr(e⎪H)/ Pr(e⎪~H)] 
 
Notice: it doesn’t matter what base we take for the logarithms. In the examples below we will 
use base 2, which allows us to talk of bits of evidence in line with the standard units of 
information theory. Shannon’s notions of Entropy and Mutual Information are standardly 
measured in bits, which are computed with equations using logarithms of base 2, though one 
could equally well use other bases. E.g. the natural logarithm is also often used, whilst Jaynes 
(2003) recommended using base 10 and so talking of decibels of evidence. 
 
One respect in which the Log-Odds scale can be simpler or easier to use is that instead of 
multiplying the priors with the odds ratio, as in the Odds equation above, the Log-Odds 
equation requires only addition. The log of the likelihood ratio, log[Pr(e⎪H)/ Pr(e⎪~H)], thus 
provides a very natural way of expressing the boost in confidence that the evidence provides, 
so as to take you from your priors to your posteriors. I.e. it is a natural way of expressing the 
confirmatory strength of one’s evidence. 
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Using the Logarithm of the likelihood ratio as a measure of confirmation also has (at least) 
two other attractive features, which have been much-discussed in the literature on 
confirmation6: 
 
(i) When we have lots of different independent pieces of evidence in favour of a hypothesis, 
using the log of the likelihood ratio makes the confirmation of each bit of evidence simply 
additive: 
 
Confirmation of H by (E1 & E2 & E3 &…En) = (Confirmation of H by E1) + (Confirmation of 
H by E2) + (Confirmation of H by E3) + …… (Confirmation of H by En) 
 
(ii) Unlike nearly all other proposed measures of confirmation7, the log of the likelihood ratio 
satisfies the following two very highly plausible constraints on any theory of confirmation: 
 
• SYMMETRY: Confirmation of H by E = Disconfirmation of ~H by E.  [i.e. the 
negative confirmation of ~H by E] 
[And so: If [Confirmation of H by E1 > Confirmation of H by E2] Then [Confirmation of ~H 
by E1 < Confirmation of ~H by E2] 
 
• LOGICALITY: All logical entailments of some H by some E have the same degree 
of confirmation, which is higher than any non-logically-entailing degree of 
confirmation. 
[And so: all logical refutations are equally strong disconfirmation, which is stronger than any 
non-logical disconfirmation.] 
 
And of course once we move to expressing probabilities using Log-Odds then they can vary 
from negative infinity to positive infinity. So there is always more ‘room’ for one’s 
confidence to increase or to decrease. At this point, it is perhaps worthwhile to briefly give a 
graphic illustration of the difference between using the 0-1 interval to express probabilities 
and using the Log-Odds Scale8. 
 
                                                      
6 See Eells & Fitelson 2000, 2002 for discussion and comparison of the main different candidate 
measures of confirmation that exist within a broadly Bayesian framework. 
7 See Crupi, Tentori, and Gonzalez 2007 for a different confirmation measure – the ‘relative distance 
measure’ – which also satisfies Symmetry and Logicality. 
8 The following diagrams are taken from the Mathematics website ‘Arbital’: 
https://arbital.com/p/bayes_log_odds/ 
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Suppose that you initially think that some hypothesis, H, is just as likely as its negation, ~H. 
So in the 0-1 interval scale you have a credence in H of 0.5; or expressed as odds, a credence 
of 1:1; expressed in terms of Log-Odds, a credence of 0 bits. Now suppose that you get five 
separate independent, 2:1 updates in favour of H. I.e. 5 independent pieces of evidence for 
which Pr(E⎮H)/Pr(E⎮~H) = 2. What is the effect of all these new pieces of evidence on your 
credences? 
 
Your credences expressed in the 0-1 interval go from: 0.5 to 0.67 to 0.8 to 0.89 to 0.94 to 0.97 
(approx.) 
 
Your odds for H go from 1:1 to 2:1 to 4:1 to 8:1 to 16:1 to 32:1 
[[Recall: Posterior Odds = Prior Odds x Likelihood ratio]] 
 
Graphically representing these changing probabilities on a line that goes from 0 to 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The probabilities approach 1 but never get there, they just keep stepping across a fraction of 
the remaining distance, eventually getting all ‘scrunched up’ near the right-hand end. If we 
instead convert the probabilities into log-odds, the picture is much clearer. 0.5, or 50%, 
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probability becomes 0 bits of credence, and every independent 2:1 observation in favour of H 
shifts belief by one unit (bit) along the line. 
 
 
 
What is important for present purposes is that a change in confidence, when represented on 
the 0-1 interval, can appear to be only slight or insignificant if it occurs near to either 
extreme. But the very same change in confidence when represented on the log-odds scale can 
be seen to be significant. The increase in confidence from 0.94 to 0.97, measured on the 0-1 
interval, is (roughly) equivalent to an increase from 4 bits to 5 bits of confidence measured in 
the Log-Odds scale – i.e. a confidence boost of 1 bit. Compare: An increase of confidence 
from 0.5 to 0.6666 is also equivalent to an increase of 1-bit. But here, in the middle of the 0-1 
interval, it is manifestly a significant increase in confidence.  
 
Another way of making the same point: on the 0-1 scale, an increase from 0.5 and 0.50009 
may appear to be of the same significance as an increase from 0.9999 and 0.99999. After all, 
it is an increase of 0.00009 in both cases, right? But if we think in terms of Odds, the former 
increase is equivalent to the change from 1:1 to 1.00036:1. Whereas the latter increase is 
equivalent to a change in Odds from 9999:1 to 99999:1. And in terms of Log-Odds, the 
increase from 0.5 to 0.50009 is a boost of only around 0.00052 Bits. Whereas, an increase 
from 0.9999 to 0.99999 is a boost of around 3.332 bits. Using the 0-1 scale then can tend to 
compress and distort our intuitive sense of how much evidential strength is needed to move 
from one level of confidence to another; the strength of evidence needed to shift from 0.9999 
to 0.99999 is massively more than that required to shift from 0.5 to 0.50009. 
 
Let’s consider now how all this applies to the ‘Anticipated Experience’ case: 
 
Suppose that merely learning beforehand, e.g. on the basis of reliable testimony, that you will 
have an experience as of a red-wall at noon – which proposition I will abbreviate to ‘exp[red]’ 
– gives you a Pr(exp[red]) = 0.95. And suppose that actually having such an experience at 
noon increases this to Pr(exp[Red]) = 0.9999999. Put in terms of log odds this would be an 
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increase of 4 bits – it would be the same amount of evidential boost as going from 0.5 up to 
0.95. 
 
I think this already shows that the first part of Barnett’s objection – “If one knows that e, then 
one has at most a little room for doubt about e. So there will be little room for one’s degree of 
certainty in e to increase” – can and should be resisted. When considered in terms of odds or 
log odds there is no lack of ‘room’. There is ample ‘space’ for actually having the experience 
to make a very significant difference over merely learning that one will have the experience 
(e.g. from reliable testimony). 
 
What about the second half of the objection Barnett makes: “and thus little room for one’s 
confidence in p to increase as a result of an increase in the certainty of e”? 
 
Well, in order to deal with updating on evidence that is less than perfectly certain, we 
standardly use Jeffrey Conditionalising: 
 
• PNEW(H) = [POLD(H⏐E) x PNEW(E)]  +  [POLD(H⏐~E) x PNEW(~E)] 
 
In this case, the less-than certain evidence, E, is the proposition that: I have an experience as 
of a red wall at noon, and the Hypothesis, H, is that: There is a red wall before me. Lets now 
plug in some numbers to illustrate how an increase in confidence about E can plausibly result 
in a significant increase in confidence about H, even if one already had a high confidence in 
E. 
 
Suppose POLD(H) = 0.5  
Suppose POLD(H⏐E) = 0.99 
Suppose POLD(H⏐~E) = 0.5 
 
And now let’s suppose that in the situation where I learn beforehand, via trusted testimony, 
that I will have an experience as of a red wall, my PNEW(E) = 0.95  
 
So then, on the basis of this testimony, my PNEW(H) = (0.99 x 0.95) +  (0.5 x 0.05) = 0.9405 + 
0.025 = 0.9655 
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But now suppose, by contrast, that actually having an experience as of a red wall makes my 
PNEW(E) extremely ‘close’9 to 1. I.e. PNEW(E) ≈ 1 
 
So then here my PNEW(H) is ≈ 0.99 
 
Given the above plausible-looking values, the difference between updating on mere 
foreknowledge via testimony of the experience vs. updating on the basis of actually having 
experiencing is (roughly) the difference between 0.9655 and 0.99. Prima facie, and expressed 
thus as a value in the 0-1 interval, this might seem only a ‘slight’ or ‘insignificant’ difference. 
 
But, if we convert these two probabilities into Odds we get (roughly): 28:1 vs. 99:1. 
Ask any gambler whether this is a ‘significant’ difference! 
 
And if we convert these odds to log odds we get: 
 
Log2(28) ≈ 4.8  Log2(99) ≈ 6.63 
 
So this is a difference of 1.83 bits, or, switching back to the 0-1 interval, the same as the 
difference between 0.5 and 0.78 – i.e. the difference between even money and odds of nearly 
4-to-1.  
 
To repeat, the difference in confidence concerning E here results in a very significant 
difference in the confidence in H. The evidential ‘boost’ that one receives from actually 
having the experience, compared with merely learning beforehand that one will have it, is 
nearly 2 whole bits of credence. The moral here: even if one is already very confident of E, 
increasing one’s confidence in E yet further can still result in a substantial, significant 
increase to one’s confidence in H. 
 
5. Summary & Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the notion of having only ‘little room left’ for one’s confidence to increase 
only seems plausible because we are expressing probabilities in the interval 0-1. If we switch 
to using Odds or Log-Odds, this appearance of there being only ‘limited room’ evaporates. 
Moreover, we have good independent reasons to think that the Log-Odds scale provides a 
better, clearer picture of the boost that a piece of evidence adds to one’s prior probabilities so 
                                                      
9 Again, the whole point of this example is that ‘closeness’ to 1 is a problematically measure-sensitive 
notion that arises when we use the 0-1 interval to express probabilities. 
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as to increase them to one’s posterior probabilities. And when we use Log-Odds to express 
the increase in confidence that there is a red wall before one that results from actually having 
the red-wall-ish experience it becomes clear how this could indeed be a significant increase. 
 
Thus, the Dogmatist’s ‘bullet-biting’ response to the Anticipated Experience case remains a 
viable response – significantly increasing one’s confidence that there is a red wall as a result 
of actually having the red-wall-ish experience need not involve any kind of diachronic 
irrationality, it can simply be the result of becoming more confident about one’s evidence. 
 
Of course, nothing I have said here is meant to provide a positive argument for endorsing 
either Dogmatism or Perceptual Partiality. I have only been arguing that Dogmatism and 
Perceptual Partiality can withstand the specific threat of diachronic irrationality that is posed 
by the ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE case. For all that has been said here, there may well 
be other problems with Dogmatism and/or Perceptual Partiality – e.g. the much-discussed 
objection due to Roger White (2006), or see Hawthorne & Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming)10. 
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